• AC Barrier Integrity

William T. Allen



Speaker Bio

• William Allen



- BP, Global Wells Org., Well Placement Advisor
- +31 years in energy industry, 13 years at BP
- UAA / AAS Technology, UoP / BS Business
- Based in Texas, United States
- Focus area Drilling, Well Placement

50 Meetings, building excellence

Ongoing support for standardized training, information sharing e.g. Hits & Misses, ebooks, Standardized performance models (error models) with ongoing maintenance

Standardized Anti-Collision method

And much,

much more

50^m General Meeting October 3rd, 2019 Calgary, Canada

Wellbore Positioning Technical Section


The Industry Steering Committee on Wellbore Survey Accuracy (ISCWSA)

So, are we done?


My Agenda today;

- Review a list of error sources than can lead to a well collision
- Controls and control types, used to prevent those errors
- Common approach to establish & maintain those controls
- Share anonymous well placement performance during a 3 well drilling program
- So, what next?





How good are the industry controls?



https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/hierarchy/default.html

The idea behind this hierarchy is that the control methods at the top of graphic are potentially more effective and protective than those at the bottom. Following this hierarchy normally leads to the implementation of inherently safer systems, where the risk of illness or injury has been substantially reduced.



How many organizations enforce Controls

- Set organization "Policy" or "Requirements" -
 - Approved tools, software, systems, AC method, etc.
- Approve/Agree Procedures needed to deliver the requirements -
 - Create "conformant" survey program, "Run" AC scan, "Sign--


Establish a way of working off" to approve, pre-job session, etc.

Create competency program

How things go unexpectedly, 3 well program


In a galaxy far far away... because well collisions never happen here!


- The team had a new platform
- The team maintained an area risk tracker, which in this case included the probability of well collision during the drilling program
 - The team listed the collision probability as "never happened in the industry"
- The team was not familiar with congested well drilling
- The team planned for 3 wells
- The team was trained and aware of well placement requirements & procedures







The plan... All plans, no real wells

































Recommendation against MASD dispensation for HSE risk wells

SUMMARY


The Collision Avoidance Work Group recommends that HSE risk offset wells should always be subject to a suitably conservative Minimum Allowed Separation Distance (MASD), and that dispensation from such rules should not be allowed. In particular, the probability of the drilling assembly failing to penetrate the offset well in the event of a collision cannot be reliably quantified and therefore does not justify dispensation against a HSE risk MASD.

P2, the probability of penetration once contact is made is not quantified in any formal or objective way. The following are examples of actions/circumstances (sometimes referred to as mitigating actions) that are commonly assumed to reduce the probability of penetration:

- Rotary drilling instead of motor drilling
- Drilling with a mill-tooth bit instead of a PDC bit
- Drilling with a dull or "shirt tail" bit
- Drilling with low ROP
- Monitoring the shakers for cement/steel
- Monitoring offset wellhead vibration
- Monitoring offset casing annular pressure
- Jetting instead of drilling
- Low angle of incidence between wells
- Soft formation
- Multiple casing strings protecting the tubing

The Collision Avoidance Work Group has considered the effectiveness of such actions and circumstances, with the objective of providing guidance to the Industry.

The consensus of the Group is that such actions may be sensible practices in close pass situations, but their effectiveness is not predictable and they cannot reliably ensure that penetration will not occur. Therefore, we do not recommend their use as justification for dispensation against the MASD criterion that would otherwise be applied to a HSE risk offset well. Their use in allowing a reduced MASD should be restricted to offset wells that do not represent a HSE risk.



Summary of Findings

There are many findings, for today, lets discuss the Controls

- Vast Majority are Admin controls
 - Reliance on people, and their imperfections regarding;
 - focus, awareness, training, prioritization, bias, pressure(s)
- Competency can be hard to create, measure, it takes time, unlikely without effective leadership and courage
- > Easy to blame team experience, capability and a lack of procedural discipline. However
 - Team was trained and certified in tools and methods & procedures. Surprisingly few requirement tasks (controls) not performed, but outcome of control failed to initiate expected outcomes e.g. stop job.
 - Once the team transitioned to their own "requirements" the team was still unable to "stop the job" until after a series of undesired results.
- Is the answer to terminate employment with the team? Have them teach others what happened? Or something possibly better – better controls?

In Conclusion yes, we can do more...

- Software that reduces admin controls, or reliance of, with underlying continuous job monitoring
 - Plan that delivers Objectives based on Historical performance & Requirements (plus?)
 - > Monitor actual performance vs. expected to achieve objectives/requirements/performance
 - Automatic escalation if failing to deliver or simply outside of limits
- Better integration of requirements into the system to limit, or prevent, poor human choices/performance, such as
 - > Poor Survey programs magnetic surveys planned inside cased hole
 - Poor Survey interval Flagging survey invalid intervals e.g. MWD survey tied to WRP followed by 200' of conductor
 - Prevent mis-match of reporting/plotting/trajectory (AC report with GWD, TC plot w/o)
- > Automated monitoring, data vetting, auto escalation
 - > As bit/sensor depth exceeded survey interval invalidating AC results escalate
 - > As survey QA/QC failed, invalidating AC results escalate
 - > If BHA can not satisfy Survey Program, notify, escalate
 - Warning, be wary of creating alarms for everything and then ignoring them...

Questions?



Wellbore Surve Wellbore Positioning





